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THE JUVENILE COURT AND
EMOTIONAL NEGLECT OF CHILDREN
[T]he juvenile division of the probate court shall have ...
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under 17 years
of age found within the county . . . who is deprived of emo-
tional well-being... I
A primary function of the Juvenile Court is to assist in the pro-
tection of children from abuse and neglect. Juvenile court acts,
2
child abuse reporting statutes, 3 and child protective services
legislation4 have incorporated provisions dealing with physical
abuse and physical neglect of children. Such legislation enables
state intervention into family life for the protection of children
exposed to harmful environments. Statutory definitions of abuse
and neglect provide a basis on which the community, frequently
through the juvenile court, may pass judgment on the existence of
child neglect and offer services or coerce family members to accept
them.5 A few states, including Michigan, 6 have expanded juvenile
' MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712 A.2(b)(l) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
2 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712 A.2(b) (Supp. 1974).
3 E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 722.571 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
4 E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 400.14(1) (1967).
5 There is an extensive legal, medical, and social literature dealing with physical aspects
of child abuse and neglect. See, e.g., V. DEFRANCIS & C. LUCHT, CHILD ABUSE
LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's (rev. ed. 1974); C. KEMPE & R. HELFER, HELPING THE
BATTERED CHILD AND His FAMILY (1972); L. YOUNG, WEDNESDAY'S CHILDREN: A
STUDY OF CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE (1964).
See also Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Battered Child
Syndrome, 50 CHI. -KENT L. REV. 45 (1973); Daly, Willful ChildAbuse and State Report-
ing Statutes, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 283 (1969); Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The
Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1(1966); Thomas, ChildAbuse and Neglect,
Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293 (1972).
6 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(b)(l) (Supp. 1974). The legislative history of the
Michigan emotional neglect statute consists almost entirely of supporting correspondence
on file with the Michigan House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. The initial
proposal grew out of efforts by Oakland County Probate Judge Norman Barnard and the
Oakland County Youth Assistance Advisory Council. The resulting bills, S.B. 462 (1971)
and H.B. 4753 (1971), included emotional neglect among the existing kinds of neglect cog-
nizable under MICH. COMP. LAWS 712A.2(b).
There is no reported committee or floor discussion on the merits of statutory recognition
of emotional neglect. Committee minutes reveal no expression of specific legislative con-
cerns, and the respective journals of the houses report only official action taken with respect
to a bill. Thus, the legislative intent of the Michigan provision is not readily ascertainable
from collateral sources; legal implications must be construed from the wording of the statute
itself.
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court jurisdiction beyond the traditional notions of physical neglect
to encompass what has come to be known as "emotional neglect,"
a concept beginning to appear more frequently in child abuse re-
porting laws as well.7 As will be suggested herein, standards for
state intervention into situations of emotional neglect can and
should be established to enable such intervention to be at least as
effective as it is in cases of physical neglect.
I. THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE OF EMOTIONAL
NEGLECT OF JUVENILES
The rationale for judicial cognizance of emotional neglect of
juveniles assumes that the consequences to a child who has been
psychologically and emotionally abused may be at least as serious
as those brought about by more physical mistreatment. 8 The need
for court jurisdiction arises because, while administrative and pri-
vate agencies may share in the task of protecting children from
abuse and neglect,9 responsibility must ultimately rest with the
I See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN §38-171 (1973); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.335(2) (Supp. 1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 14.403 (1974); S. D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 26-10-10 (1973); TENN. CODE ANrN. § 37-1203 (Supp. 1974); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 34.01 (1973).
Such legislation is to be distinguished from statutes conferring juvenile courts jurisdiction
over a class of minors. It embodies an "action-forcing" scheme directed at doctors, nurses,
social workers, and others, mandating these people to report to proper authorities instances
of abuse or neglect of which they obtain knowledge.
I As used herein, "emotional neglect" may include consequences for a child which are
physical in nature. For convenience, however, physical and emotional neglect are distin-
guished; not all emotional neglect has direct or immediate physical consequences. Where
physical abuse is manifest, it is presumed that conventional abuse statutes can take cogni-
zance of it.
For extensive discussion and documentation of the widespread incidence of physical child
abuse and neglect together with proposed solutions, see generally Hearings on S. 1191
Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The resulting legislation, the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101 et seq. (1974) establishes a "National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect" and provides money for demonstration programs for the
identification and treatment of child abuse and neglect. The primary focus of the hearings
was the "battered child," but there is frequent reference to the issue of emotional neglect.
The act defines child abuse and neglect to include "mental injury." 42 U.S.C.A. § 5102
(1974).
For a thoughtful survey of the process of state intervention into the parent-child relation-
ship with heavy emphasis on child neglect, see S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL, THE
LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY BREAKDOWN (1971).
With respect to a child's emotional and psychological needs in child placement efforts,
with considerations equally relevant in the neglect context, see generally, J. GOLDSTEIN,
A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) (hereinaf-
ter cited as J. GOLDSTEIN.) See also L. COSTIN, CHILD WELFARE: POLICIES AND
PRACTICE, 264-65 (1972); M. WALD, PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND EMOTIONAL NEGLECT
(1961).
9 Mulford, Emotional Neglect of Children, 37 CHILD WELFARE 19 (1958).
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courts, where removal of the child from the family, termination of
parental rights, or coerced treatment are contemplated. 10 Child
protection is, of course, primarily a parental duty.I Where parents
fail to meet the obligations of parenthood the responsibility shifts
by necessity to the institutions of the state.
Criteria for court intervention are manifested in the minimally
acceptable standards of parental conduct set forth in juvenile court
jurisdictional provisions. 12 Such provisions provide norms for ac-
ceptable child-rearing practices. Their basic goal is the prevention
of social, physical, and psychological deterioration of children
13
Most statutory neglect provisions focus on "physical harm, moral
deprivation, and deficiencies in environmental -conditions,' 14
rather than the total constellation of interfamilial conduct and at-
titudes - the stuff of psychological well-being.' 5 The law has long
10 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A 19(A) (Supp. 1974); cf. In re LaFlure, 48
Mich. App. 377, 210 N.W.2d 482 (1973) (circumstances sufficient to justify temporary
placement of a child out of the home under the custody of the juvenile court do not necessar-
ily justify termination of parental rights).
See also V. DEFRANCIS, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS-BALANCING THE
EQUITIES (1971); Becker, Due Process and Child Protective Proceedings State Interven-
tion in Family Relations on Behalf of Neglected Children, 2 CUMBERLAND-SAMFORD L.
REV. 247 (1971).
11 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, CHILDREN'S DIVISION, A
NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON CHILD ABUSE (1972); H. SIMMONS, PROTECTIVE SERVICES
FOR CHILDREN, CHILD ABUSE, AND NEGLECT (1968).
'2 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.2(b)(1), (2) (Supp. 1974).
13 See generally Cheney, Safeguarding Legal Rights in Providing Protective Services, 13
CHILDREN 86 (1966).
The need for explicit jurisdiction over matters of emotional neglect was well stated by
Judge Norman Barnard of the Oakland County Juvenile Court in a letter to the Michigan
Legislature urging passage of the Michigan provision, now MICH. COMP. LAWS §
712A.2(b)(l) (Supp. 1974):
My experience as a Probate Judge in Oakland County has'brought to my
personal attention the damage that is so often perpetrated on children where
parents are unable to provide loving, affection, and secure relationships. Many
children who are seen in our Court are not battered or beaten in a physical
sense, but their very existence has been permanently affected by an unwhole-
some environment. Parents who display an inability to alter the negative rela-
tionships with their children are guilty of producing many, if not most, of the
young people in our society who will be a detriment to the society.
Letter to the Michigan Legislature, June 15, 1971 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
14 S. KATZ, supra note 8, at 61.
15 Cf. Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes involving Third Par-
ties, 73 YALE L. J. 151, 157-63 (and footnotes regarding "psychological well-being" con-
tained therein) (1963).
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sought to promote the child's best interest by protecting his physi-
cal integrity, without parallel consideration of his emotional de-
velopment and mental health.1 6 And it may be that the physical-
emotional dichotomy is illusory in the child development
context. 
17
Central to the case for the judicial recognition of emotional neg-
lect is the hope that detrimental family emotional dynamics can be
identified and ameliorated before a child is permanently affected.
18
Statutes which allow courts to consider these factors endeavor to
broaden the definition of neglect to take into account the
psychological health of the child or parent. They do this by requir-
ing (or at least allowing) the judge to consider the relative strengths
and weaknesses of a family-indeed, to examine the quality of the
parent-child relationship. These provisions "recognize not merely
the child's physical condition, but rather the totality of its
well-being."' 9
Given that emotional neglect can detrimentally affect a child's
development as substantially as physical abuse and neglect, some
other factors must be considered. Emotional deprivation may be
more devastating in long term impact than occasional physical
abuse.2 0 While traditionally recognized abuse and neglect can cer-
tainly be detrimental to a child's development, they may be more
easily mitigated than emotional neglect in many cases. But tradi-
tional neglect syndromes are more visible; furthermore, there is a
greater consensus as to what forms of physical neglect transgress
16 For discussion of the range of parental conduct relevant to the consideration of neglect,
see N. POLANSKY, CHILD NEGLECT-UNDERSTANDING AND REACHING THE PARENT
(1972):
It is presumed that physical, emotional and intellectual growth and welfare are
being jeopardized when for example, the child is: 1) malnourished, ill-clad,
dirty, without proper shelter or sleeping arrangements; 2) without supervision,
unattended; 3) ill and lacking essential medical care; 4) denied normal experi-
ences that produce feelings of being loved, wanted, secure and worthy; 5)
failing to attend school regularly; 6) exploited, overworked; 7) physically
abused; 8) emotionally disturbed, due to continous friction in home, marital
discord, mentally ill parents; 9) exposed to unwholesome and demoralizing
circumstances.
Note that 4) and 9) are components of emotional neglect.
17 J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 4; L. COSTIN, supra note 8, at 264; Gill, The Legal
Nature of Neglect, 6 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 1, 10-13 (1960).
18 E.g., V. DEFRANCIS, ACCENT ON PREVENTION (1971).
19 S. KATZ, supra note 8, at 62.
2 0 See, e.g., M. WALD, supra note 8, at 1.
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community and legislative standards. Therefore, traditional neg-
lect is more likely than emotional neglect to be reported to appro-
priate authorities, who are, for the same reasons, more willing to act
on the reports they receive.21
Nonetheless an emotionally damaged child is likely to suffer
adult psychopathologies 22 and so may become a burden upon the
state. Judicial recognition of mental health considerations, how-
ever, may enable earlier intervention in mitigation of this tendency.
A court's intervention may also prevent future neglect.2 3 Unloved
21 Juvenile court adjudication of neglect or dependency on the basis of nonphysical,
intangible harm is not, however, a completely unknown phenomenon. There are numerous
cases dealing with parental mental disturbances, discussed infra, notes 83-84. The following
cases terminated or abridged parental rights for the reasons indicated: Altamirano v. Direc-
tor of the Travis County Welfare Unit, 465 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (mother's
failure to continue treatment and medication necessary to control her emotional disorder;
children found to be without "proper parental control"); In re McDonald, 201 N.W.2d 447
(Iowa 1972) (parents' low I.Q., though the children were normal in all respects, mentally and
physically); In re H Children, 65 Misc. 2d 187, 317 N.Y.S. 2d 535 (1970) (adultery by
children's mother); Kennedy v. State, 277 Ala. 5, 166 So. 2d 736 (1964) (Evidence estab-
lished that spastic parents lacked emotional and physical capacity to adequately care for
their children.); State v. Bacon, 249 Iowa 1233, 91 N.W.2d 395 (1958) (Despite adequate
physical care and affection, the best interests of the child required termination of custodial
rights to better afford the child emotional security, "freedom from constant shifting about,"
and other uncertainties.); In the Matter of Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 411, 238 N.Y.S. 2d 422
(Family Ct. 1962) (immoral and improper conduct of mother sufficient to deny custody);
Coulter v. Sypert, 78 Ark. 193, 95 S.W. 457 (1906) (father's indifference and lack of affection
for child and deficient moral character); In re Watson, 95 N.Y.S.2d. 798 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1950) (mother's emotional condition and her religious fanaticism); See also In re Sampson,
65 Misc.2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), where the Family Court ordered medical and
surgical care for a child over the parent's religious objection. The court gave great weight to
the developmental and psychological impact on the child from the parent's refusal to correct
a gross physical deformity. See also People v. Phipps, 97 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1950) (persistent questioning by father of three-year-old child as to identity of mother's
paramour, supported. finding of neglect).
As observed in In re Roe, 59 Misc. 535, 92 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949):
(T]o subject a child to a sense of insecurity, either by way of rejection or ill
treatment ... which will result in the development in children of aggressive
tendencies and delinquent conduct, is neglect . . . of a very serious nature.
Children are entitled to not only food, clothing, and shelter, but are entitled to
guidance, advice, counsel and affection, understanding, and sympathy, and
when these are not accorded them ... because of inability to love or under-
stand and sympathize ... that would constitute serious and severe neglect.
Judicial recognition of nonphysical aspects of neglect is also suggested by In re Morrison,
295 Iowa 301, 313-14, 144 N.W.2d 97, 104 (1966) where the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
[Children may have] not only [adequate physical care, but also] love, affec-
tion, and security, freedom from unwholesome influences, morally and men-
tally, as they grow up to adulthood.
22 H. SIMMONS, supra note 11, at 48.
23 Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 7.
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children become unloving parents, perpetuating the cycle of
neglect.2 4 The emotional climate of the home is thus an important
and legitimate object of the law's concern. Emotional neglect may
be the precursor of serious physical abuse; full protective ser-
vices may necessitate intervention on that basis.
2 5
Another basis for intervention could be the child's right to a
reasonable opportunity to develop into a well-adjusted adult. 26 The
law has traditionally been solicitous of parental rights to raise and
control children. Though this attitude is basically sound, it should
not be used to disguise the rights of a child.
Another justification for court intervention is the correlation be-
tween emotional neglect and delinquency:
27
Impressive professional validation is on hand to establish that
intensively acting-out delinquents, the so-called hard core of
the delinquency problem, come from emotionally im-
poverished homes and unhappily grow up to perpetuate in
their own adulthood the same destructive parental care.
28
The value ofjurisdiction over emotional neglect in this context is
that it allows the courts to focus on the problem, rather than merely
On the result.
Despite a dearth of emotional neglect statutes and reported case
law, juvenile court judges have been entertaining cases involving
variants of emotional neglect. Jurisdiction in such cases has typi-
cally been grounded upon either "mental care" provisions or a
24 "Most of the abusing parents have suffered extreme emotional deprivation in early
childhood ...- THE AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, supra note 1I, at 48.
25 Hearings, supra note 8, at 13, 153. See also AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, supra
note 11, at 18.
26 Cf. Foster and Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 343, 347 (1972),
arguing that
a child has a moral right and should have a legal right ... to receive parental
love and affection, discipline and guidance, and to grow to maturity in a home
environment which enables him to develop into a mature and responsible adult
See also Rosenbert, The Right to a Sound Mind, 10 TRIAL 36, 37 (1974); THE WHITE
HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, 1970 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, recommending a
"Bill of Rights" for children which included a right to be "wanted" and to "grow up
nurtured by affectionate parents;" L. COSTIN, supra note 8, at 6.
27 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, 197, 199
(1967); H. SIMMONS, supra note 11, at 49; AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, supra note
11, at 48.
28 Gill, supra note 17, at 10.
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familiar rubric found in many neglect provisions: "other care
necessary for his well-being. ' 2 9 A more direct method, of course,
would be for legislatures to explicitly recognize emotional neglect
as a ground for judicial intervention and provide some standards
for application in that context:
[1]f the court's protective service to the community is to be
reasonably geared to the community's needs, the law should
recognize emotional neglect and provide, as it can, proper
safeguards against the dangers implicit in the field.
30
II. THE CONTENT OF EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING
The state's concern for a child's well-being would be reflected in
a grant of jurisdiction to the juvenile courts over cases of emotional
neglect. Such concern must recognize the variety of ways in which
a child's emotional health can be endangered in the family context.
Existing statutory provisions in some states identify a range of
nonphysical neglect. In the abstract, they refer to the mental health
of the parent, parental failure to respond to a child's existing
mental health problem, and the inadequacy of the parent-child
relationship. 31 This final category emphasizes the impact on the
child more than the status or conduct of the parent and is the key to
the emerging concept of emotional neglect.
32
The problem most frequently noted is the relationship marked by
deprivation of parental love and affection. Though it is generally
accepted that the potential for resulting emotional damage is
enormous in the absence of "love and affection, ' 3 there is consid-
erable difficulty in the application of the concept. 34 Perhaps be-
cause this variant of emotional neglect speaks fundamentally to
many of the imponderable attributes of successful parenthood,
legislatures have been reluctant to use it as an explicit criterion of
29 Id. at 11. See also Todd v. Superior Ct., 68 Wash. 2d 587, 414 P.2d 605 (1966); notes 21
supra and 83-84 infra.
Cf. In re Viske, 147 Mont. 417, 413 P.2d 876 (1966), where the court, under a "proper
care" provision, took judicial notice of emotional needs of an infant requiring satisfaction
equally as demanding and developmentally significant as physical needs.
30 Gill. suwra note 17, at 11.
31 See text accompanying notes 87-101 infra.
32 See, e.g., M. WALD, supra note 8; Muford, supra note 9.
" See, e.g., E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1963); S. FRAIBURG, A
COMMENTARY REPORT, THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN BONDS (1967); A. FREUD,
NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD (1965); J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at
9-21; P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER & J. KOZEN, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PERSONALITY at
153-83 (1963). Gill, supra note 17, at 10-12; Comment, Emotional Neglect in Connecticut, 5
CONN. L. J. 100 (1972).
'4 See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW,
413-16 (1966).
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intervention. Without a clearer understanding of the nature of this
aspect of emotional neglect, misapplication is likely where neglect
is statutorily recognized.
35
The establishment of a mutually gratifying, continuous relation-
ship with a mothering figure who cares for and stimulates the child
from infancy is crucial to the development of the child's ability to
relate to others and become self-reliant.36 This mutual interaction,
where marked by love, affection, reciprocal emotional exchange,
and confidence, fulfills basic needs of the infant essential to his
psychological development and is of continuing importance to
young children and adolescents. 37 Neglect might derive from pa-
rental conduct of any kind which "denies a child the love and
affection he supposedly needs to become a healthy, emotionally
stable, productive member of society." ' 38 The absence of continu-
ing affection and stimulating relationships with adults may threaten
successful maturation by severely retarding a child's physical,
3, For two statutes explicitly mentioning "affection" see IDAHO CODE 16-1625 (Supp.
1974) and REV. STAT. OF ONTARIO ch. 64, 20(l)(b)(xi) (1970).
36 Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third
Parties, 73 YALE L. J. 151 (1963), contains a concise discussion of the attributes and
importance of a child's psychological well-being. See In re Adoption by P., 114 N.J. Super.
584, 277 A.2d 566 (1971).
37 Id. According to one expert, a child's present and future emotional stability is highly
dependent upon fulfilling a child's need to
experience a warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with his mother (or
permanent mother-substitute-one who steadily" mothers" him) in which both
must find satisfaction and enjoyment.
J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE 13 (1965).
38 C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER,supra note 34, at 413. Fosterand Freed,supra note 26,
state at 347 that
The need of a child for. parental love and affection is so thoroughly
documented by clinical and common experience and the literature of
behavior science that it may be considered accepted as an established fact.
See also Watson, The Children ofArmageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969).
Where a child is consistently made to feel inferior or where other children are overtly
favored, emotional damage may result. Gross inconsistency of, or the lack of, controls over
a child may have an adverse impact on his or her psychological growth as well. Severe
marital discord, open hostility, repeated acrimonious verbal confrontations and the absence
of a positive emotional climate also suggest family dynamics conducive to emotional neglect
to the' extent that they demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to their impact on a child's
psychological health. Adjudication of an emotional neglect petition might entail the exami-
nation of the attitudes of both parents toward their children and the child's attitude toward
his parents.
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emotional, and intellectual development. 39 This potential cost to
the child suggests socially acceptable parameters of parental con-
duct which, if properly applied, might serve as the basis for judicial
cognizance of emotional neglect.
Robert Mulford, an early advocate of juvenile court response to
emotional neglect, has defined emotional neglect as
the deprivation suffered by children when their parents do not
provide opportunities for the normal experiences producing
feelings of being loved, wanted, secure, and worthy which
result in the ability to form healthy object relationships....
The parent's lack of love and proper direction, and his inability
to accept a child with his potentialities as well as his limita-
tions, may constitute emotional neglect.
40
Clarence Cole of the Juvenile Court of Oakland County,
Michigan, has suggested emotional neglect, so understood, is more
easily detected than the language of the literature implies:
Friends and relatives often notice parents treating one child
differently than [sic] the others. Maybe the child has to eat
meals alone in another room or in the basement. Perhaps he
isn't allowed to do certain things. Teachers often notice the
3' See, e.g., L. COSTIN, supra note 18, at 264; H. SIMMONS, supra note 11, at 52. The
impact of emotional deprivation and, more particularly, "maternal deprivation" has been
well documented in the context of institutionalized infants. Despite adequate physical care
the lack of emotional stimulation has a demonstrable impact on psychological development.
Goldstein has compiled the following relevant research sources:
The deficits in the psychological development of institutionalized infants
(some of whom received excellent physical care) have been documented by
many studies. See Margaret A. Ribble, The Rights of Infants (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1943); W. Goldfarb, "Effects of Psychological
Deprivation in Infancy and Subsequent Stimulation" (American Journal of
Psychiatry, 102:13-33, 1945) and "Psychological Privation in Infancy and
Subsequent Adjustment" (American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 15:247-255,
1945); Rene A. Spitz, "Hospitalism" (The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,
1:53-74; New York: International Universities Press, 1945) and "Hospitalism: A
Follow-up Report" (Ibid., 2:113-117, 1946); Rene A. Spitz and K.M. Wolf,
"Anaclitic Depression" (Ibid., 2:313-342, 1946); John Bowlby, Maternal Care
and Mental Health (Geneva: World Health Organization Monograph No. 2,
1951); H. L. Rheingold, The Modification of Social Responsiveness in In-
stitutionalized Babies (Monographs of the Society for Research in Child De-
velopment, Vol. XXI, Serial No. 63, No. 2, 1956); M.A. Ainsworth et al.,
Deprivation of Maternal Care: A Reassessment of Its Effects (Geneva: World
Health Organization, Public Health Papers 14, 1962) ....
40 Mulford, supra note 9, at 21.
On the importance of being wanted, see J. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 20.
Cf. IDAHO CODE § 16-1625 (Supp. 1973), which incorporated the language used by Mul-
ford for its definition of "emotional maladjustment." See text accompanying note 98 infra.
Journal of Law Reform
symptoms in a bright child who cannot achieve. Sometimes a
doctor or social agency in contact with the family notices that
one child is unwanted.
4 1
The literature on emotional neglect suggests additional symp-
toms which might be relevant in adjudication.42 It is suggested that
the nature and quality of the affection relationship between parent
and child, though largely intangible, does have physical correla-
tives. The most dramatic example is a "failure to thrive" which
has no organic cause. 43 Other physical manifestations of emotional
neglect include inability to walk and talk, hyperactivity, and with-
drawal. In addition, enuresis, nail-biting, fire-setting, excessive
nervousness, gross tantrums or passivity, excessive crying, and
gross developmental deficiencies have been advanced as
consequences of emotional neglect. Such a catalogue is only sug-
gestive and varies greatly with developmental stages.
There remains, however, some difficulty in translating the ab-
stractions of the psycho-social literature regarding the necessary
components of healthy emotional growth into an emotional neglect
statute with precision sufficient for its rational and fair application
by a juvenile court. Since the parent-child relationship is at stake, a
court must take particular care not to focus on talismanic attributes
41 Unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form.
Underlying reasons for these phenomena have been noted:
The emotional climate within the family is of critical importance .... Overbur-
dened parents unable to deal with the multiple responsibilities of parentage,
parents trapped in the arena of marital discord, emotionally troubled or
psychotic parents, parents with personalities too callow to provide their chil-
dren with the normal experiences of love and security, commonly fall short of
supplying the continuity and predictability of affectionate interest essential for
the sound emotional development of the child. Emotional neglect serves the
legal and psycho-social field as a label for the resulting situation in which the
child manifests symptoms of an abnormal personality structure, which is be-
lieved to be due to the lack of a loving parent-child relationship.
Comment, Emotional Neglect in Connecticut, 5 CONN. L. REV. 100 (1972).
See also P. DECOURCY & J. DECOURCY, A SILENT TRAGEDY, CHILD ABUSE IN THE
COMMUNITY (1973).
42 See Comment,supra note 41, at 114-15; L. COSTIN, supra note 8; M. WALD,supra note 8;
Mulford, supra note 9.
43 Failure to thrive is manifested by such symptoms as severe undernourishment, de-
velopmental retardation, and abnormal reaction to stimulation. Although such characteris-
tics can result from conventional physical neglect, there is growing recognition that they can
result from social and psychological causes as well.
L. COSTIN, supra note 8, at 262-63.
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of emotional neglect in isolation. The impact on the child is a
product of a total relationship, and care must be taken to evaluate
the positive aspects of the relationship as well as the negative
aspects.44
II. STANDARDS FOR STATE INTERVENTION
A. The Need for Standards
Given that parental conduct may adversely affect a child's
psychological well-being, controversy continues as to whether
court intervention is advisable at all and, if it is, as to what specific
parental conduct justifies intervention in a given case. Even where
a state has expanded child neglect jurisdiction to explicitly recog-
nize emotional neglect, the appropriate standards for intervention
remain elusive. Michigan, for example, has provided for juvenile
court jurisdiction over a child "who is deprived of emotional
well-being." ' 45 Such economy of language has been applauded for
vesting needed judicial discretion in an area requiring flexibility
and judgment; 46 it may just as well be condemned as a license for
unwarranted intrusion. The intangibility of the very concept of
emotional neglect, the lack of standards for application, constitu-
tional doubts, judicial overreaching, selective enforcement, the
vagaries of prediction, and the frequent lack of remedial alterna-
tives all operate to cloud the recognition and implementation of
emotional neglect jurisdiction. These intangible attributes of emo-
tional neglect require special concern with respect to possible con-
stitutional defects where "emotional neglect," becomes a statu-
tory ground for intervention by the state. The basic goal of a child
neglect law is to prevent social, physical, and psychological de-
" A juvenile court itself may be an unwitting purveyor of emotional neglect of the very
children it seeks to protect. At least one case has recognized this possibility where it was
sought to return a child to her natural mother who attempted to renege on a voluntary
consent to adoption after the child had establsihed a positive psychological relationship with
adoptive parents. In re Adoption of Child by P., 114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566 (1971).
" MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712 A.2(b)(I) (Supp. 1974).
46 As Katz has suggested:
Because we have not yet acquired sufficient knowledge about normal and
abnormal child development, it is not suggested that an elaborate or detailed
definition of' 'emotional neglect" be frozen into a statute.... The recognition of
mental health as a relevant factor, however, will open up an avenue ofjudicial
inquiry that takes cognizance of the complexity of individuals and the unreliabil-
ity of depending exclusively on "conduct-based" or "event-based"
classifications.
S. KATZ, supra note 8, at 68.
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terioration of children. Accomplishment of that goal may entail
substantial interference with family life, including termination of
parental rights. The United States Supreme Court has consistently
held unconstitutional those statutes, civil and penal, which fail to
explicitly define activity being regulated or which fail to provide
legally fixed standards upon which a trier of fact may properly
decide whether the statute's requirements have been met. For ex-
ample, in Baggett v. Bullitt47 the Court stated:
[A] law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as its
meaning and differ as to its application violates due process of
law. 48
It is the language of the statute, and not the factual setting which
produces the constitutional challenge, that governs whether a sta-
tute is to be judged void for vagueness. 49 The command of statu-
tory precision requires specificity sufficient to provide notice and
warning of proscribed or required conduct. 50 The intangibility of
emotional neglect as a concept thus raises issues of notice, warn-
ing, and standards. These issues are intensified because there is
less agreement on the manner of conduct adversely affecting a
child's psychological well-being and the greater difficulty in
measuring or even immediately perceiving that adverse impact.
Several recent lower federal court cases stand for the proposi-
tion that broad delinquency jurisdictional provisions are impermis-
sibly vague. Representative of these matters are Gesicki v. Os-
wald51 and Mailliard v. Gonzalez.52 Gesicki found New York's
Wayward Minor statute 53 impermissibly vague and dismissed the
argument that jurisdiction over such subject matter is nonpenal and
therefore subject to civil standards only. Similarly, Mailliard
applied due process notions of statutory definiteness to invalidate a
47 377 U.S. 360-(1964).
4s Id. at 367.
49 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). But see Parker v. Levy, 42 U.S.L.W. 4979
(June 19, 1974).
50 402 U.S. at 616.
51 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd without opinion, 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
52 See 42 U.S.L.W. 3016 (Jul. 10, 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 416
U.S. 918 (1974).
13 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 913-a(5) (McKinney 1958).
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California jurisdictional provision covering any juvenile "in danger
of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." 4
Yet the common law doctrine of parens patriae asserts the
state's duty to establish the minimum standards of child protection
and to enforce those standards where they are transgressed. 55 At
least one case has held that the state's legitimate interest as parens
patriae may justify the broad scope and ambiguity of neglect provi-
sion:
What might be unconstitutional if only the parents' rights were
involved, is constitutional if the statute adopts legitimate and
necessary means to protect the child's interest.
56
A separate constitutional question arises from the fundamental
interest of parents in rearing their children without unjustified state
intrusion. 57 It seems constitutionally mandated that the standards
for intervention established by the state be reasonable and ration-
ally related to a legitimate state purpose. Indeed, because interven-
tion intrudes upon the privacy of family life, perhaps those stan-
dards must reflect a compelling state interest.5 8 A broadly stated
intervention imports a fear of judicial overreaching. In fact, courts
have been traditionally reticent to intervene absent a highly visible
5' CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1972).
On the "vagueness" doctrine in general, see Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doc-
trine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). Cases dismissing the argument in
the neglect context include In re Morrison, 259 Iowa 301, 144 N.W.2d 97 (1966); In re
Cager, 251 Md. 473, 248 A.2d 384 (1968); State v. MacMaster, 259 Ore. 291, 486 P.2d 567
(1971); In re Black, 3 Utah 2d 315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955).
For discussions of statutory vagueness in the juvenile delinquency and "status offense"
context see Comment, Juvenile Delinquency Laws: Juvenile Women and the Double Stan-
dard of Morality, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 313 (1971); Comment, Parens Patriae and Statutory
Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973).
" Gill,supra note 17, at 5;see generally Comment, Parens Patriae andStatutory Vagueness
in the Juvenile Court, supra note 54.
56 State v. MacMaster, 259 Ore. 291. 296, 486 P.2d 567, 569 (1971).
5' Cf. Wisconsin v, Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972), referring to a
[S]trong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents . . . is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition.
s The constitutionally protected parent-child relationship is exemplified by Pierce v.
Society Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Such cases have taken on expanded significance suggesting the need for state deference to
parental childrearing practices. See Burt, Forcing Protection on Children & Their Parents:
TheImpactofF. Wyman v.James,69 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1276-77(1971). Meyer andPierce,
in turn, have been cited in the privacy context recently in Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152(1973).
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degree of neglect. Jurisdiction based on emotional neglect may
operate to expand the area of relevant judicial inquiry, but it does
not of itself portend the demise of judicial conservativism in neg-
lect adjudication.
These legal considerations aside, there are transactional costs
attached to vague definition of standards for intervention. Early
court intervention into a destructive family environment may pro-
vide a greater opportunity for amelioration of adverse effects than
does late intervention, but it exacerbates potentially oppressive or
officious state intervention. On the other hand, waiting for the
development of concrete symptoms may counter judicial over-
reaching while significantly reducing the likelihood of rehabilita-
tion. Explicit standards may encourage a court to intervene in a
timely fashion, the court having been given standards specific
enough that the facts of neglect may be readily determined.
A specific emotional neglect statute may promote community
awareness and understanding of what constitutes emotional neg-
lect and what situations offer legal bases for action. This, in turn,
makes people in referral positions more likely to report situations
detrimental to a child's welfare. Child protection agencies then
know what might constitute legally recognizable neglect; their case
preparation in support of a petition is enhanced accordingly. The
effectiveness of social workers and other experts as witnesses in
adjudication is likewise promoted. Without specific legislative or
judicial guidance, some cases may be brought unnecessarily before
the court and others denied the attention they warrant. The
attorney's role in a contested emotional neglect adjudication is
confounded because he, too, is without criteria to evaluate the
case, prepare a defense, or assert the child's interest. The judge is
impeded in defining his role as he evaluates expert testimony or
applies the law to the facts. Finally, the parents may be embittered
and frustrated by an inability to comprehend the basis upon which
they are alleged to have failed their child.
59
'9 As has been noted:
All parents prefer to think of themselves as good parents. . . . [W]hen a parent
is first told that he may have damaged his child emotionally or physiologically
by depriving the child of needed love, the parent tries to understand but
frequently cannot. Due to the fact that no one can satisfactorily explain what is
meant, the parent becomes even more anxious and distrustful, and any pros-
pect for rehabilitation is consequently diminished.
Comment, supra note 41, at 113.
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B. The Content of Standards
Generally, courts must find a causal relationship between paren-
tal conduct and its adverse impact upon the child in order to inter-
vene in a case of child neglect.6 0 Where emotional neglect is in-
volved, courts must be prepared to look for nonphysical manifesta-
tions of it. Since the impact of parental conduct upon the child is
determinative, it should be noted that the same parental conduct
may have differing effects upon a child depending upon the child's
age and stage of development.
Several approaches to the identification of emotional neglect are
suggested in the limited legal literature on the subject. 61 Conclu-
sions as to proper standards vary with the degree of trust the pro-
ponent has in the judgment of the juvenile court (the ordinarily
suggested forum) on one hand and his faith in the predictive tools
of the behavioral sciences on the other.
Judge Gill of the Connecticut Juvenile Court Bench, an early
advocate of jurisdiction over cases of emotional neglect and a
prime mover behind the 1967 Connecticut legislation in this field,
62
suggests a standard of intervention based on reasonable reliance on
specialists. He thus endorses nonspecific legislation because
[e]ach child embodies his own unique combination of physical,
psychological and social components; no child has quite the
same strengths or weaknesses as another or exactly the same
relationship with his family. The parental failure which mar-
kedly damages one child might leave another quite untouched.
This interaction between the child and his family is the essence
of a neglect situation, the imponderable which defies statutory
constraint.
63
Judge Gill suggests that, given the variety of parent-child relation-
ships with potentially adverse effects, statutory precision is likely
to be impossible. Attempts to be precise would unduly restrict
judges in an area where flexibility is needed. The "reasonable
man" test is derived from tort law analogies, as exemplified by
60 As Gill notes:
[N]eglect statutes are concerned with parental behavior not as behavior per se,
but only and solely as it adversely affects the child in those areas of the child's
life about which the statutes have expressed concern.
Gill, supra note 17, at 5.
6 See text accompanying notes 66-77 infra.
62 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-53 (Supp. 1973).
63 Gill, supra note i7, at-5.
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People ex rel. Wallace v. LaBrenz, 64 in which neglect was defined
as the "failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly
demand." ' 65 Judge Gill would, however, place careful reliance
upon experts to enlighten the court as to the existence of emotional
harm in a particular case:
No child should be found to be emotionally neglected without
a psychiatric or psychological evaluation of his emotional con-
dition .... Such an evaluation is not, of course, conclusive of
the court's decision, but without it the petitioner's burden of
proof has not been sustained .... [A] court without clinical
services, no matter how positive the authorization of its gov-
erning neglect statute, cannot properly pass upon alleged cases
of emotional neglect.
66
Other writers, expressing concern for judicial overreaching and
standards without specific content, stress the need for greater
statutory precision and standardized criteria for intervention.
Cheny, reflecting on the danger of unwarranted intrusion into fam-
ily life, the uncertainties of psychiatric knowledge, and the impre-
cision of prediction based on such knowledge, argues that court
intervention in cases of emotional neglect is justified only where
the parent's conduct has an objectively demonstrable and severe
impact on the child. 67 He asserts that such provisions should:
[D]esignate the denial of a continious affectionate relationship
as a criterion for intervention in family life ... but should be
restricted to cases where the child's intellectual development
or the development of his capacities is seriously retarded.6"
He suggests further that intervention should be based on legislative
and judicial standards that focus not upon parental conduct in the
abstract, but upon the impact of that conduct on the child's be-
havior.
64 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
65 Id. at 624, 104 N.E.2d at 773.
66 Gill, supra note 8, at 12. One difficulty with the seemingly necessary reliance upon
expert testimony of psychologists or psychiatrists is the lack of access by many to such
people. A recent poll of over 1,500juvenile court judges reveals that 83 percent did not have
such access. McCune and Skeler, Juvenile Court Judges in the United States, Part I, A
National Profile, II CRIME & DELINQUENCY 121, 128 (1965).
Cf. In re Farley, 162 Cal. App. 2d 474, 328 P.2d 230 (1958). See also In reDenise Lee
Meyer, 204 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 1973), where the Iowa Supreme Court required that
psychological reports be made available to counsel prior to trial and that the persons making
such reports be presented at the proceeding for cross-examination unless their unavailability
could be justified. See also In re Delaney, 185 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 1971).
67 Cheney, Safeguarding Legal Rights in Providing Protective Services, 13 CHILDREN 87
(1966).
68 Id. at 89.
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Fear that uncertain standards might promote premature court
intervention under joint judicial and professional ignorance has led
the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare to advise against legislative recognition of
emotional neglect. 69 Such a view denies the hope of preventive
efforts. In contrast, Cheny's view reflects a greater faith in the
"state of the art" of the behavioral sciences.
Sullivan expresses serious doubt about nearly all interventions
by the courts in areas involving mental health because standards
are vague or nonexistent, detailed findings are scarce, and there is
danger that judges will interpret their authority so as to impose
their personal notions of child care and morality upon family
units.70 Expressing particular concern for parental rights, Sullivan
would require, in mental health cases, the demonstration of a
causal relationship between parental behavior and harm to the
child in terms of a very high intervention threshold:
[M]entally disturbing parental action would be harmful enough
to justify a finding of neglect if there were a probability that
such continued behavior would lead to the child's having a
severe mental disturbance, i.e., psychosis or severe and de-
bilitating neurosis.
71
Sullivan draws a parallel between parental material impoverish-
ment and mentally disturbing conduct and asserts that neither sup-
ports a finding of neglect.
Paulsen 72 describes the minimum required parental conduct as
that which "falls below the very minimum of acceptable parental
behavior." '7 3 This suggests a lower standard than Judge Gill's
"reasonable prudence." But Paulsen also observes that neglect
standards vary with such circumstances as the relationship be-
tween the child and custodian, the disposition sought in the particu-
lar proceeding, and the goal of the intervention.7 4
6" See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & SANDERS, supra note 34, at 414.
70 Sullivan, Child Neglect: The EnvironmentalAspects, 29 OHIO STATE L. J. 85 (1968).
7' Id. at 113.
72 See Paulsen, supra note 4. Elsewhere Professor Paulsen acknowledged the dilemma of
emotional neglect but stated that it was a concept whose time had not yet come. Paulsen,
The Law and the Abused Child, in THE BATTERED CHILD 186 (R. Heifer and H. Kempe
eds. 1968).
73 Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect, and Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile
Court, in JUSTICE FOB THE CHILD 74 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
Cf. In re Adoption of H, 330 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Fam. Ct. 1972) (Neglect should be based on
the minimum level of parental care tolerable in the community.).
71 Paulsen, supra note 73, at 74.
WINTER 1975]
Journal of Law Reform
The Paulsen view perhaps represents a satisfactory compromise
in a search for standards for judicial intervention. Given the fear of
overreaching by application of unproven hypotheses, perhaps the
disposition sought should control the standard applied and the
proof required for intervention. For example, if termination of pa-
rental rights is the goal of the proceeding, a greater showing of
causal relationship between parental conduct and objectively de-
monstrable adverse impact on the child should be required than in
a set of circumstances where the goal of intervention is less disrup-
tive of the family unit. A court should always require a showing of
demonstrable adverse impact on the child, but a less obtrusive
intervention need not require physical manifestations. Nor, in such
a situation, should it be necessary to wait for the development of
classical pathologies. Under guidelines of this sort, intervention
with an appropriate judicial remedy could be timely and, therefore,
preventive.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Legislative recognition of the emotional neglect of juveniles var-
ies according to whether it focuses on a parent's own emotional or
mental incapacities, on a parent's failure to meet a child's particu-
lar mental or emotional needs or incapacities, or on a general no-
tion of a child's emotional well-being.75 The statutory schemes
share a fundamental premise: despite physical well-being, a child
may still be exposed to circumstances likely to promote emotional
damage to an extent warranting state intervention through the
juvenile court.
A. Emotional or Mental Incapacities of the Parent
Several states define child neglect to include emotional and men-
tal incapacities of a parent on the premise that such incapacity does
or may have an adverse impact upon the child. 76 In Ohio a juvenile
7 A child's emotional well-being may also be considered relevant in contexts other than
neglect. Thus Michigan's Child Custody Act of 1970, MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 722.23 (Supp.
1974-75), provides several criteria for determination of custody disputes. In determining the
best interest of the child, a court is to consider, inter alia:
(a) [t]he love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the competing
parties and the child. (b) [tihe capacity and disposition of competing parties to
give the child love, affection and guidance ... (g) [tihe mental. . . health of the
competing parties. ...
76 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533.2(1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(15)(b) (1969);
N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
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court may exercise jurisdiction over "any child . . . who lacks
proper care or support by reason of the mental . . . condition of his
parents, guardian or custodian." ' 77 Similarly, in Minnesota a child
may be found "dependent" because of the "emotional, mental, or
physical disability, or state of immaturity of his parent[s]. ' ' 78 Ne-
braska recognizes a temporal dimension to parental incapacity by
providing for termination of parental rights when it is in the best
interests of the child and
[T]he parents are unable to discharge parental responsibilities
because of mental illness or mental deficiency, and there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such condition will continue
for a prolonged indeterminate period. 79
It is not clear whether these statutes assume a concern that
emotional instability of parents will directly affect the child's emo-
tional health or a fear that such instability will increase the likeli-
hood that the child's physical needs will not be adequately met.
The latter reading is not similar to the conventional, physically
based standard for intervention,8 0 and therefore does not address
the broader concept of less tangible, emotional neglect.
71 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.04(B) (Page Supp. 1973). Cf. In re Larry and Scott H,
192 N.E.2d 683, at 686(Ohio Juv. Ct. 1963), where evidence, based upon expert psychiatric
testimony, revealed a paranoid schizophrenic parent allegedly incapable of providing proper
child care. The court recognized that
mental illness of a mother could effectively destroy the parent-child relation-
ship and could greatly impair the mother's ability to nurture and rear her
children . .. , but 192 N.E.2d at 686 conflicts in the evidence coupled with
inadequate proof that the children were adversely affected resulted in denial of
the dependency petition.
71 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(6)(d) (1971).
19 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-209 (5) (1968). Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19(a) (Supp.
1974).
1o Note that courts have found neglect on the basis of parental mental disturbance without
specific enabling legislation referring to it. See Belisle v. Belisle, 27 Wis. 317, 134 N.W.2d
491 (1965). (An emotional disturbance of a parent harmful to a minor child's welfare is
tantamount to a finding of unfitness.); Todd v. Superior Court, 68 Wash.2d 587, 414 P.2d 605
(1966) (Parents' disturbed condition rendered the home an "unfit place."). A thoughtful
dissent concedes that "mental illness of a parent will, of course, affect the attitudes and
emotional well-being of a child" but questions whether the legislature meant to empower the
court to take charge of a child whenever its parent is not providing it with a perfectly healthy
atmosphere. Id. at 599, 414 P.2d at 612. See also State v. Blum, I Ore. App. 409, 463 P.2d
367 (1970), terminating parental rights of a mentally ill mother of an illegitimate child where
the mother was unable to provide physical or emotional care for the child and her condition
was considered permanent. Cf. In re Millar, 40 App. Div. 2d 637, 336 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1972)
(a child living alone with a chronic paranoid and severely psychotic, schizophrenic mother
held to be "in imminent danger" by becoming mentally or emotionally impaired).
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B. Failure of the Parent to Care for the Child's Mental Disability
The most common type of neglect provision touching upon a
child's emotional well-being deals with the refusal or neglect by the
parent to adequately care for the child's demonstrated mental or
emotional condition.8 1 Under such legislation, where a child has a
highly visible emotional problem or mental disorder, a parent may
be required to secure appropriate treatment or be confronted with
juvenile court intervention. Mississippi, for example, defines a neg-
lected child as one who " . . . lacks the special care made neces-
sary for him by reason of his mental condition, whether said condi-
tion be mentally defective or mentally disordered." '8 2 Minnesota
employs similar language: refusal of a parent to provide necessary
mental health care constitutes neglect;8 3 inability to provide it war-
rants an adjudication of dependency.84 Florida defines as "depen-
dent" a child who is neglected as to "psychiatric, psychological or
other care necessary for his well-being." '8 5
This notion of neglect does not focus on the adequacy of the
interpersonal relationship between parent and child. Advocates of
jurisdiction over this broader relationship argue that use of failure
to provide special care to trigger jurisdiction prevents courts from
intervening in time to adequately serve the interests of the child.
8 6
C. Emotional Neglect as a Substantive Jurisdictional Criterion
Emotional neglect has been acknowledged as a substantive
jurisdictional criterion in only a handful of states. Some states
provide for court intervention in behalf of children deprived of
"emotional well-being, ' 8 7 in those terms or in equivalent lan-
guage.
8" See Sullivan, supra note 70, at 110.
'2 MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5 (1972). This is representative legislative language. See also
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-201(3)(d) (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03(D) (Page Supp.
1973).
sa MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(10)(d) (Supp. 1974).
84 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(6)(b) (Supp. 1974).
85 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.09(10)(d) (Supp. 1974). See also ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-201(2)
(1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13(1)(e) (1957).
86 Gill, supra note 17, at 5; Katz, supra note 8, at 64.
"7 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-201(2) (1974) ("emotional well-being"); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 17-53 (Supp. 1974-75) ("denied proper care... emotionally..."); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24A-401(h)(l) (Supp. 1974) (without "care or control necessary for ... emotional
health..."); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(b)(1) (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. §
419.476 (1973). Cf. UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 5(1) (without " ... care ..
necessary for. . . mental, or emotional health ... ").
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The language of these statutes lacks further explication, guidance,
or standards, thus lending themselves to a broad reading.8 8 Thus
Oregon defines a neglected child as one whose parent or legally
responsible guardian has " . . . failed to provide him with the care,
guidance, and protection necessary for his ... mental or emo-
tional well-being." 8 9
Some jurisdictions have attempted to express legislative intent
more explicitly. Minnesoat, for example, provides for jurisdiction
in circumstances of parental incapacity and failure to provide for
special emotional needs and then resorts to general language to
define a dependent child as one who is ". . . without . . . other
care necessary for his . . . mental health . .. because his par-
ent . . neglects or refuses to provide it." 90
Idaho has provided additional specificity by granting juvenile
court jurisdiction over children evidencing "emotional maladjust-
ment," which refers to:
[T]he condition of a child who has been denied proper parental
love, or adequate affectionate parental association, and who
behaves unnaturally and unrealistically in relation to normal
situations, objects and other persons. 9'
This provision conveys an operational idea of what is meant by
emotional neglect. In addition to explicitly recognizing the
dynamics of intra-family relations, the definition provides a court
with some interpretive guidance. While its requirement of a de-
monstrable impact on the child may retard early intervention, it is
unique in its identification of inadequate parental love and affection
as a component of neglect. The provision transcends the traditional
physical touchstones of neglect and, for that reason, could stimu-
late prevention-oriented intevention.
The Canadian Province of Ontario authorized its family courts
to intervene under the 1954 Child Welfare Act on behalf of
88 It is suggested that this was the intent of the Connecticut and Michigan legislatures in
enactingtheirprovisions.See Comment,supra note4 1, at 105 and note6supra. OneConnecticut
case, through reversing an emotional neglect adjudication, implies such an intent from prior
legislation. Suprenant v. Commission of Welfare, 21 Conn. Supp. 154, 148 A.2d 669 (1958).
s1 ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.476(a) (1973).
90 MINN. STAT. ANN. 260.015 10(c) (Supp. 1974). Gill criticizes this approach as focusing
on the parent rather than on the impact on the child. Gill, supra note 17, at 12. Katz finds the
statute more susceptible to a child-oriented interpretation encompassing the totality of the
child's well-being. S. KATZ, supra note 8, at 60-62.
91 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1625 (Supp. 1974). This is the language employed by Mulford,
supra note 9, at 4.
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[A] child who is emotionally rejected or deprived of affection
by the person in whose charge he is to a degree that on the
evidence of a psychiatrist who is on the register of specialists
in psychiatry of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons
of Canada or of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Ontario is sufficient to endanger his emotional and mental
development. 92
This provision was changed in the 1965 Child Welfare Act, which
defined "a child in need of protection" as, inter alia,
[A] child whose emotional or mental development is en-
dangered because of emotional rejection or deprivation of af-
fection by the person in whose charge he is.
93
The provision is employed with regularity. 94 This provision, in
terms similar to Idaho's, recognizes deprivation of affection as a
jurisdictional basis for court intervention. The threshold of inter-
vention is arguably lower in Ontario than in Idaho because, in
Ontario, rejection or deprivation of affection sufficient to endanger
emotional or mental development is sufficient in itself to permit
court intervention.
New York's neglect provision represents the most thorough
functional definition of emotional neglect as a basis for state
intervention.9 5 The jurisdictional provisions take emotional health
into account in the operational definitions both of an abused
child9 6 and a neglected child.9 7 The provision defines emotional
health in terms of specific functional manifestations. "Impair-
ment" of a child's "emotional health" and "impairment of mental
or emotional condition" includes:
[A] state of substantially diminished psychological or intellec-.
tual functioning in relation to, but not limited to, such factors
as failure to thrive, control of aggressive or self-destructive im-
pulses, ability to think and reason, or acting out or mis-
behavior, including incorrigibility, ungovernability or habitual
92 Child Welfare Act of 1954, REV. STAT. OF ONT., c. 64, 20(l)(b)(xi).
93 Child Welfare Act of 1970, REV. STAT. OF ONT., c. 64, 20(l)(b)(xi).
94 Letter from Betty Graham, Director of Child Welfare in Ontario, to Oakland County
Juvenile Court, April 28, 1971. In the Province of New Brunswick, similar Family Court
jurisdiction has been enacted, though still requiring written psychiatric evidence. Child
Welfare Act, S.N.B. 1966 c. 3 § 7(g).
95 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §1011 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1974-75).
96 Id. § 10 12(e) (Supp. 1974-75).
97 Id. § 1012() (Supp. 1974-75).
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truancy; provided, however, that such impairment must be
clearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of the re-
spondent to exercise a minimum degree of care toward this
child. a 9
The requirement of "substantially diminished psychological or
intellectual functioning" sets a high threshold for court interven-
tion, but this is countered somewhat by the language of Section
1012(f)(i), which suggests latitude for prediction of potential
harm. 99 The provision does not specifically suggest that depriva-
tion of parental love and affection is necessarily a component of
impaired mental or emotional health, except to the extent that
"failure to thrive" is premised on that notion. 100 Another unique
feature of the statute is the linking of emotional and mental im-
pairment to such phenomena as incorrigibility, ungovernability,
and truancy. These phenomena are frequently reserved for delin-
quency provisions and acted upon under that rubric rather than in
the context of child neglect. That such behavior on the part of
children should be explicitly recognized as touchstones of emo-
tional neglect is significant.
To invoke court jurisdiction, the New York provision requires a
showing that impairment of emotional health is "clearly" the result
of parental unwillingness or inability to exercise a minimum degree
of care. 10 1 Like traditional neglect provisions, it looks to parental
conduct to determine culpability; like more modern provisions, it
requires scrutiny of the impact upon the child for a determination
of the effect of such conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
Court jurisdiction over cases of emotional neglect can be an
important tool to advance the goals of child protection as well as
the concept of a minor's legal right to an emotionally healthy envi-
ronment. But there are factors that counsel against hasty or ill
considered invocation of the court's jurisdiction-particularly
where it will result in termination of parental rights. Although
many children are subjected to extreme deprivation, both physi-
cally and emotionally, they later make appropriate adjustments and
9s Id. § 1012(h) (Supp. 1974-75).
99 The statutory language includes . . . imminent danger of becoming ....
100 See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
o" Id. § 1012 (h) (Supp. 1974-75).
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not infrequently come out of the experience unscathed. There is an
acknowledged lack of predictive capability on the part of the expert
disciplines from which dispositive evaluations and recommenda-
tions must be drawn. Frequently, the judicial process can offer no
better an environment than the one to which the child is already
exposed. Court involvement itself may have an undesirable impact
upon the child. Removal from even an emotionally neglectful par-
ent may be emotionally detrimental. These considerations
undoubtedly import a tension with which juvenile courts must live
if the state is to recognize mental health as a legitimate basis for
intervention into the life of the family.
There must be a reconciliation of the conflicting goals of early
intervention, effective prevention of harm, and premature intru-
sion in violation of a traditionally respected zone of privacy. The
power of the juvenile court is extensive; the neglect context in
particular permits wide discretion. But despite the residuum of
judicial power, the juvenile court is an institution of limited
capacities. The power to intervene may be expansive, but it ought
to be employed with a measure of humility, in recognition of the
court's own limitations. If the state is required to present an articu-
lated, reasoned, and authoritatively documented case, with full
opportunity for interested parties, represented by counsel, to chal-
lenge judicial conclusions, then the needs of society and emotion-
ally neglected juveniles may be well met.
-James B. Stoetzer
